Hate and Hyperbole

Debasing the Currency of a Powerful Word

A news report about the apprehension of Tyler Robinson, the alleged shooter of Charlie Kirk, referred to comments from one of Robinson’s family members. The suggestion was that Robinson considered Kirk as “full of hate and spreading hate”. The comments appear in a transcript of comments from Utah Governor Spence Cox.

I hold no brief for Charlie Kirk. From what I have read he held some forthright views that he expressed in a robust manner. He was not afraid to debate his views and in that respect his willingness to engage with his critics is an element of his exercise of freedom of expression that is absent from many commentators.

But was he full of hate? Was he spreading hate?

Those two questions beg another question. What is “hate” or “hateful” and inevitably in that discussion we flow into the area of hate speech and hate crime.

The New Zealand Law Commission carried out a consultation about hate crime. It attracted 96 submissions. The submission underscored the perils of trying to create a clear legal definition of an inherently subjective topic.

In the summary of submissions the Law Commission said

“Submitters were evenly divided on whether there are problems with the current law. Likewise, there was no consensus among submitters on whether to adopt a new legal model for responding to hate crime.”

It is unclear whether the Law Commission, in the absence of consensus, will proceed further or will not pursue the issue. In the consultation paper it advised that it would

“conclude the review by presenting a final report with our advice to the Minister of Justice on any changes we think should be made to the law. We anticipate providing our report to the Minister in mid-2026. The report will also be presented to Parliament and published on our website.”

Certainly it showed no such reluctance to engage with contentious and divisive issues in its “Ia Tangata: A review of the protections in the Human Rights Act 1993 for people who are transgender, people who are non-binary and people with innate variations of sex characteristics” Report recently released.

We shall have to see what happens next.

The Law Commission consultation on hate crime had its origins in the 15 March 2019 terrorist attack two mosques in Christchurch which claimed the lives of 51 people, leaving 40 people with gunshot injuries. The murder, attempted murder and wounding of these people was a devastating example of a hate crime.

A Royal Commission of Inquiry was established to investigate whether public sector agencies had done all they could to protect the people of New Zealand from terrorist attacks and whether more could be done to prevent attacks in the future.

In relation to hate crime, the Royal Commission recommended the creation of new hate crime offences. These would impose higher maximum penalties for crimes committed because of an offender’s hostility towards a group of people who have a common characteristic.

In its consultation paper the Law Commission defined “hate crime” as conduct that

(a) is already a criminal offence under New Zealand law; and

(b) is carried out because of hate or hostility towards a group of people who have a common characteristic (for example, race, colour, nationality, religion, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, age or disability).

The term “hate” is used broadly in the consultation paper to refer to hostility, prejudice, or intolerance, rather than as a specific legal term. But the paper avoids a specific definition of hate. The indicators of hate are hostility, prejudice or intolerance rather than being a strict legal term.

I would have thought that a careful and accurate definition of hate as a specific element of a “hate crime” would have been axiomatic.

The Police have their own definition of hate crime even although there is no legislative basis for it. The Police define hate crime as

“any offence which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated, wholly or in part, by hostility or prejudice based on a person’s particular characteristic such as race, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability or age”

Rather the Law Commission was of the view not all hate crimes are motivated by intense emotional hate; many are driven by prejudice or intolerance toward a particular group. Furthermore not all crimes motivated by hate qualify as hate crimes unless the offender's hate is directed at a protected characteristic.

In light of such ambivalence over definitions it is unsurprising that there was an absence of consensus.

Interestingly there was an earlier consultation in 2021 carried out by the Ministry of Justice in seeking feedback on proposals against the incitement of hatred and discrimination. The general thrust of the proposals was to strengthen the parts of existing law that protect groups from speech that incites hatred, and by improving protections against discrimination.

This paper did not explicitly define “hate” or “hateful” but it did provide a form of context for hate speech or speech that incites hatred. It referred to provisions in the Human Rights Act which basically provides that

“Speech that ‘incites hatred’ is abusive or threatening speech that stirs up hostility towards a group of people (rather than being directed at one person) based on a common characteristic they share”

Thus the focus is on speech that incites hatred rather than providing a specific definition of “hate” or “hateful”. Such speech is harmful, it is claimed, in that it spreads animosity, distrust, and division, and can lead to violence.

As to the last suggestion, it is often difficult to establish a causative link between the speech on one hand and the violence on the other. In the case of Brenton Tarrant the hate link was clear from the manifesto he released and the manner in which he committed his crimes.

The Human Rights Commission released a copy of its submissions to the MOJ proposals in August 2021. The HRC went further than the MOJ and defined “hatred” in the context of legal provisions. It suggested, referring to the Canadian case of Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v Whatcott (2013) 1 SCR 467 that the legislative term “hatred” or “hatred or contempt” must be interpreted as being restricted to those extreme manifestations of the emotion described by the words “detestation” and “vilification.”

Furthermore the term hatred in a legislative hate speech prohibition should be applied objectively to determine whether a reasonable person, aware of the context and circumstances, would view the expression as likely to expose a person or persons to detestation and vilification on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination.

The HRC approach was that the term "hatred" in proposed reforms would likely apply to extreme views only, protecting freedom of expression while targeting harmful speech at the serious end of the spectrum.

Interestingly the Human Rights Commissioner, Paul Hunt, penned an op-ed which appeared in the Herald on 31 August 2021. In the obtuse language of the Left, well marinated in Critical Theory Mr. Hunt posed the question “What’s the most effective way of stopping – or at least moderating – hate speech?” And his answer was

“A fair, equitable, inclusive, diverse, plural, open, multicultural society which, in Aotearoa New Zealand, is grounded on Te Tiriti o Waitangi.

We need education, health, economic and other systems that embody these values.

A public service that listens to, and delivers for, communities, as well as dynamic community networks that are the lifeblood of any society.

We also need a vibrant democracy and respect for the rule of law.

Among those laws we need sensible hate speech laws. They have a role to play but, by themselves, hate speech laws don’t stop hate speech any more than red lights stop trains.”

But it is what follows that is really interesting because it refines the definition of hate speech and provides us with something else.

“Nonetheless, hate speech laws do something extremely important.

They send the message that vile speech can have terrible consequences and it is not tolerated in Aotearoa New Zealand.”

Hate speech has become vile speech, observing later in the op-ed

“We must give more attention to challenging vile speech, whatever side of the legal threshold it falls.”

So even if the speech is lawful it must be challenged if it is “vile”. He goes on to say:

“The Human Rights Commission already calls out vile speech, whether it is lawful or unlawful”

What is clear from Mr Hunt’s comments is that, as is so often the case with pronouncements grounded in Critical Theory, he relies on a high level of subjectivity in his judgement of speech. This is somewhat at odds with the measure submission that the HRC made on the MOJ paper.

Perhaps an even more subjective comment was made on what amounts to hate speech. The comment was made by a leading academic at a Conference I attended. Without a twinkle in his eye or an ironic smile on his face, in a serious tone of voice he said:

“Hate speech is speech I hate to hear.”

You don’t get more subjective than that.

The concern that I have about the use of the words hate and hatred is that they are used hyperbolically and the sting of the meaning is thereby cheapened and the word is debased. It seems to be used as a catchall for anything that the listener dislikes and does not want to hear; perhaps the advocacy of a position that is inimical to the listener’s world view.

The distinction between subjective interpretation ("what the listener hates to hear") versus objective criteria for hate is crucial. A robust definition of hate can't simply rely on the receiver's reaction, as that would make the concept entirely relativistic and potentially trivialize genuine instances of hatred while overextending the label to mere disagreement or offense.

Even so hate as a standalone phenomenon—without explicit threats—can still be considered harmful for several reasons. First, there's the psychological dimension: sustained hatred corrodes both the person harbouring it and often those targeted by it. When expressed, hate speech can contribute to social atmospheres that dehumanize particular groups, potentially leading to discriminatory behaviour even without direct threats.

The sociological argument suggests that hate expressions, even without immediate violent threats, can normalize prejudice and create climates where violence becomes more likely. This is sometimes called the "pyramid of hate"—where biased attitudes and hate speech form a foundation that can escalate to more severe forms of harm.

But it is here that a tension arises. If we define harmful hate too broadly, we risk criminalizing or stigmatizing legitimate expressions of strong disapproval or moral condemnation. The challenge lies in distinguishing between hate directed at ideas, behaviours, or choices versus hate directed at people for immutable characteristics or group membership.

Should hate speech contain some immediate threat of physical violence – what I have referred to elsewhere as “dangerous speech”.

By requiring an immediate threat of physical violence, one is essentially adopting something closer to the "imminent lawless action" standard from the US case of Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 US 444 (1969) —focusing on speech that creates clear and present danger rather than speech that merely offends or expresses prejudice.

This approach has several strengths. It provides an objective, measurable criterion rather than relying on subjective reactions. It also protects against conceptual drift where "hate speech" becomes so elastic that it encompasses any strongly worded disagreement or expression of disapproval that someone finds objectionable.

However, this definition might be too restrictive in some important ways. What of the case where someone systematically dehumanizes a group—calling them vermin, diseases, or subhuman—without explicit threats.

Historically, such rhetoric has preceded and facilitated violence by others, even when the original speaker made no direct threats.

The Rwanda genocide, for instance, was preceded by radio broadcasts that dehumanized Tutsis without necessarily including specific violent threats.

There's also the question of implicit versus explicit threats. What about speech that strongly suggests violence without stating it outright? Or coordinated campaigns designed to intimidate through volume and persistence rather than explicit threats?

The problem is that other than direct threats might suggest indirect or less than immediate threats. This distinction is crucial to my framework. This it becomes necessary to be more precise about indirect threats.

Coordination/instruction without explicit threats: "Meet at [location] tomorrow at midnight, bring baseball bats, you know what to do." This contains no direct threat but seems designed to organize violence.

Historical/coded incitement: "Remember what we did to [group] in 1938" or using recognized symbols/phrases that audiences understand as calls to violence without stating it explicitly.

Dehumanization campaigns: Systematic rhetoric portraying groups as diseases, vermin, or existential threats that historically precedes violence by others.

My framework would exclude these because they don't contain immediate, explicit threats of physical violence.

And there's a strong argument for that exclusion—these cases do involve interpretation of intent and context, which reintroduces the subjectivity that should be avoided.

The core tension is whether speech can be meaningfully violent or dangerous without explicit threats. My position is that without that directness and immediacy, we're dealing with offensive or prejudiced speech rather than true "hate speech"—and that maintaining this bright line is more important than capturing edge cases that might facilitate violence indirectly.

The problem with the hyperbole surrounding hate speech is that there seems to be a tendency to conflate different levels and types of negative sentiment—treating strong disagreement, criticism, dislike, or even disgust as equivalent to hatred, and then labelling all of it as "hate speech."

This conflation creates several problems. First, it dilutes the meaning of actual hatred, which presumably involves a more intense, sustained, and often irrational animosity. Second, it can shut down legitimate criticism or debate by labelling it as inherently harmful. Third, it makes the concept of "hate speech" so broad as to become nearly meaningless.

The emphasis on requiring immediate threats of violence serves as a way to distinguish between speech that poses genuine danger and speech that merely expresses strong negative views. Without that threshold, "hate speech" risks becoming a category for any expression that particular groups find objectionable or offensive.

The distinction matters because strong dislike or antipathy toward certain groups, ideas, or behaviours isn't necessarily irrational or harmful. Someone might have strong negative feelings about particular religious practices, political movements, or cultural behaviours based on reasoned moral or practical objections. Calling such expressions "hate speech" essentially immunizes those practices from criticism.

My framework based on immediacy of physical harm would protect this kind of robust disagreement while still maintaining boundaries around speech that crosses into actual threats of violence. This seems to preserve space for vigorous public debate while maintaining safety from genuine intimidation.

The question now becomes one of whether or not Tyler Robinson was correct in describing Charlie Kirk as full of hate and spreading hate. It seems horrifying that such a misunderstanding of the nature of hate and hate speech should lead to political assassination.